My intent in writing this dissertation is to assess the relationship between government regulation and farmers' revolution in productivity. In recent years Americans have become increasingly disenchanted with regulation. Critics frequently charge that regulation reduces efficiency because it fixes prices above or below levels that would prevail in a free market. In my own study I take exception with this negative perspective. Rather than focus on short-term changes in prices, I ask how regulation affected farmers' long-term investment calculus. In particular, I test the proposition that regulation actually accelerated the rate of productivity growth because it mitigated certain risks inherent in farmers' commodity markets so as to create a new climate for investment. My analysis is divided into two parts: the first part examines how regulation stimulated investment and encouraged higher rates of productivity growth; the second part considers the effects of government intervention in the decades since the Great Depression.
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In the first part, I begin with the notion that it is not intuitively evident that New Deal regulation contributed to farmers' revolution in productivity. One could argue, for instance, that in the years prior to 1930 farmers reported few gains in productivity simply because scientists and engineers had not introduced *This dissertation was written at Brown University under the supervision of Naomi R. Lamoreaux. I address these questions in a detailed study of the evolution of one region, the Corn Belt, in the years immediately before and after regulation took effect (approximately from 1920 to 1940). I chose the Corn Belt because it was one region in which three important inventions were introduced during the interwar years: the tractor, the mechanical corn picker, and hybrid corn. Of the three inventions, the tractor was the most important. It was introduced during the 1920s, whereas the other two inventions were introduced during the 1930s. Thus, it is the pattern of diffusion of the tractor that allows us to answer the first question --namely, whether prior to the coming of regulation farmers were reluctant to innovate despite their intensely competitive market.
The case of the tractor indicated that during the 1920s farmers had delayed investments. I estimate, based simply on the tractor's cost savings relative to that of a team of horses, that more than half of all farmers in the Corn Belt could have reduced their cost of production by adopting the mechanical invention. In reality, however, only a quarter of the farmers made investments. This conservative behavior is important because it translated into fewer gains in labor productivity. During the 1920s the tractor provided nearly all gains in labor productivity. I calculate that if those farmers who could have reduced costs by investing in a tractor had done so, then labor productivity would have risen from 8 percent for the decade to 12 percent. In other words, farmers would have achieved a 50 percent increase in their rate of growth of labor productivity had they based investments simply on cost savings.
Farmers delayed investments, I argue, because technology posed a conflict between safety and productivity. Farmers' concern for safety arose out of the unstable nature of commodity markets. Because prices were volatile, farmers faced the risk that in any random year prices could fall short of their average cost of production --turning profits into losses. To contain the risk of ruinous prices, farmers developed a simple strategy: they relied on resources they never paid for in cash but instead obtained from their farm. Farmers could opt for this strategy because they rarely paid cash for their two most important items --labor and horses.
Farmers obtained labor from themselves and their families.
Similarly, horses were raised, fed, and pastured on the farm itself. As farmers avoided cash expenses they reduced the risk that even if prices fell sharply they would actually lose money.
This strategy clearly gave farmers greater security, but it nevertheless contained its own hidden penalty. The strategy implicitly made farmers judge Aside from the tractor, midwestern farmers also invested in the other two inventions --hybrid corn and the mechanical corn picker. Hybrid corn offered roughly a 200 percent return on investment with little risk of actually losing money. The seed was introduced in the mid-1930s and by the end of the decade farmers had planted it in nearly two-thirds of all corn fields. In the ease of hybrid corn, I conclude that farmers invested in the seed because it was so cheap; regulation most likely played little role in the seed's rapid diffusion. As to the mechanical corn picker, it is impossible to determine whether regulation caused farmers to invest in this invention because the invention become profitable in the mid-1930s, or at the same time that the regulatory programs were introduced. Still, it is possible that farmers could have clung to their conservative strategy, ignoring the safer investment elimate and delaying investments. But this did not happen. Within three years after the mechanical corn picker become profitable, roughly three-fourths of farmers who should have used it did so. Overall, during the Great Depression farmers in the Corn Belt doubled their rate of growth of labor productivity over that of the 1920s. I estimate that regulation was associated with perhaps one-third to one-half the gains.
In the second part of the dissertation, I examine the effects of regulation for the farm sector as a whole in the period since 1930. Legislators originally designed the Commodity Credit Corporation to prevent prices from falling and assumed that in the event that prices met the intended goal (that is, if prices rose), the agency would play no role. This policy, while intended to counter low prices in the Great Depression, had ironic results when it was employed after World War ]]. In the 1950s and 1960s, as increases in supply pushed prices lower, the CCC placed strong supports under prices. The agency not only stabilized prices, but it also subsidized farm income and farm investment. Moreover, as regulation stimulated higher rates of investment, it accelerated gains in productivity and by implication accelerated the decline in the number of farms. Regulation, however, had much different consequences when in the 1970s the demand for corn, cotton, and wheat sent these crop prices to high levels. With this new prosperity, the CCC was instructed not to raise its loan rate. The agency, therefore, was unable to slow the decline in prices once prices fell back to lower levels. Thus, I conclude that for several decades regulation had stimulated extraordinarily high rates of investment, only to leave farmers vulnerable to a credit crisis in the 1980s.
